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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 920248-CA 
v. : 
ROBERT TODD WHITE, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Robert Todd White appeals his conviction of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), 58-
37-8(2)(b)(ii) (1990). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Defendant challenges the issuance of a warrant to 
search his home, the authority to serve the warrant upon a "no-
knock" entry, and the authority to serve the warrant at night. 
The State frames the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Was the Warrant to Search Defendant's Home 
Supported by Probable Cause? A magistrate's probable cause-based 
decision to issue a search warrant is given great deference on 
review. Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 
2331 (1983); State v. Babbell. 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah App. 1991). Thus the 
affidavit supporting the warrant is reviewed only for a 
"substantial basis" upon which the magistrate could find probable 
cause. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915, 104 S. Ct. 
3405, 3416 (1984). 
2. Did the Magistrate Properly Authorize Unannounced, 
"No-Knock" Service of the Search Warrant? As set forth more 
fully in the body of this brief, a magistrate's "no-knock" 
decision should also be reviewed with great deference. The 
warrant affidavit, however, must make a particularized showing 
that no-knock service is necessary. State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 
732-33 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). 
3. Was any Problem with the Magistrate's Authorization 
of Nighttime Service of the Warrant Rendered Moot, or Harmless 
Error, by Actual Service during the Daytime? As set forth in the 
body of this brief, this is a question of law, reviewable without 
deference to the trial court's ruling. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
reads as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Utah's "no-knock" search statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-
23-10 (1990), states in pertinent part: 
2 
When a search warrant has been issued . 
. . the officer executing the warrant may use 
such force as is reasonably necessary to 
enter: 
• • • 
(2) Without notice of his authority and 
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the 
warrant directs in the warrant that the 
officer need not give notice. The magistrate 
shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, 
that the object of the search may be quickly 
destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that 
physical harm may result to any person if 
notice were given. 
The text of any other constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of this appeal will be 
contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Robert Todd White was charged with unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a 
second degree felony (R. 16J.1 He moved to suppress evidence 
seized in a warranted search of his home, arguing that the 
warrant was unsupported by probable cause, and that authority to 
serve the warrant on a no-knock, nighttime basis was improperly 
granted (R. 21). The motion was denied (R. 83). 
Defendant then pleaded no contest to a reduced charge 
of possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), 58-37-
8(2)(b)(ii) (1990) (R. 76). As permitted under State v. Serv, 
758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), defendant reserved the right to 
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress (id.). His zero to 
xThe trial court pleadings record is R. 1-104; the transcript 
of the suppression motion hearing is R. 105-202. 
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five year sentence was suspended subject to probation and payment 
of a fine and surcharges (R. 86). This disposition, in turn, was 
stayed upon issuance of a certificate of probable cause pending 
this appeal, brought on timely notice (R. 86, 95, 96). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Warrant and the Search 
The warrant affidavit (R. 28-33, Appendix 2 to Br. of 
Appellant) was submitted by Detective Bill McCarthy, an 
experienced narcotics investigator with the West Valley City 
Police (R. 30). The affidavit recited that a confidential 
informant, "CI," had reported a West Valley duplex apartment to 
be a cocaine dealing site. 
According to the affidavit, CI's spouse had purchased 
cocaine in the apartment, most recently within the preceding five 
days (R. 30). While CI had not been inside the apartment, CI had 
seen the spouse enter it, then exit with cocaine which the spouse 
then ingested (id.). The spouse had also told CI that persons 
inside the apartment were the spouse's cocaine source (id..). CI 
reported that the spouse had been purchasing cocaine at the 
apartment for at least the past six months (R. 31). 
CI's information had been corroborated in several ways. 
First, Detective McCarthy checked the spouse's criminal record, 
uncovering a prior narcotics arrest (R. 31). Next, a "second 
source of information," also related to CI's spouse, had 
confirmed that the spouse had a long history of cocaine abuse 
(id.). Like CI, the "second source" had also seen the spouse at 
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the apartment, and heard the spouse admit to purchasing cocaine 
there (id.)- Finally, Detective McCarthy had watched the 
apartment, observing vehicles arrive and stay for "a very short 
period of time," consistent with narcotics trafficking (id..)* 
McCarthy's warrant affidavit also asked permission to 
serve the warrant on a no-knock basis and at night (R. 32). The 
affidavit recited that the items to be seized, including 
narcotics, packaging material, paraphernalia, cash, and 
transaction records, could be "very easily destroyed" (R. 31-32, 
33). It also recited that, according to CI, CI's spouse had been 
threatened by the cocaine suppliers at the apartment when the 
spouse had been late in paying for the cocaine; further, the 
spouse had threatened CI against reporting the cocaine 
transactions to police (R. 31). 
Finally, the affidavit recited McCarthy's "firm belief" 
that no-knock warrant service was safer. This was based on his 
experience in serving "numerous narcotics search warrants w[h]ere 
weapons have been readily available to the occupants," and his 
knowledge "that more and more narcotics dealers are arming 
themselves to protect the sales operations from other 
dealers/users" (R. 32-33). 
Based on the foregoing affidavit information, the 
magistrate issued a warrant to search the apartment (R. 25-27, 
Appendix 2 to Br. of Appellant). The warrant was authorized for 
service "without notice of authority or purpose" and "at any time 
of the day" (R. 25). However, while served in "no-knock" 
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fashion, the warrant was not served at night, but at about 10:45 
in the morning of February 1, 1991 (R. 114, 127). The search 
revealed "five bindles of suspected cocaine" in defendant's 
possession, leading to the charges against him (R. 17). 
The Motion to Suppress 
Defendant's motion to suppress alleged the absence of 
probable cause to issue the warrant, and inadequate justification 
for no-knock, nighttime service (R. 21). Defendant also alleged 
that the warrant affidavit contained "false statements and 
material omissions of fact," but did not specify any particular 
falsehoods (R. 22). Finally, while the motion recited that it 
was based upon both the fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
(R. 21), it was unaccompanied by any articulated argument for 
separate analysis under these two provisions. 
At the hearing of the motion to suppress, the 
prosecutor cited Utah case law to the effect that the burden of 
proof rested with defendant (R. 109-10). Accordingly, the trial 
court assigned defendant to the task of proving the invalidity of 
the warrant (R. 113). 
Upon direct examination by defense counsel, Detective 
McCarthy readily revealed the names of "CI" and the "second 
source" who had provided the information recited in the warrant 
affidavit. Those names are not fully repeated in this brief, out 
of concern for the informants' safety. However, CI turned out to 
be "Mrs. Jimmy;" her husband, "Jimmy," was the cocaine-habituated 
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"spouse" identified in McCarthy's affidavit. The "second source" 
turned out to be Jimmy's parents. 
Detective McCarthy explained that his investigation had 
begun in response to Mrs. Jimmy's report of Jimmy's cocaine 
purchases (R. 117). She and Jimmy's parents had independent 
knowledge of Jimmy's transactions at the duplex apartment, 
although they had not directly witnessed those transactions (R. 
120). Utility checks on the apartment had not revealed 
defendant's name, and McCarthy acknowledged that he had been 
unable to identify who actually lived in the apartment when he 
sought the warrant (R. 121). 
Turning to the manner of warrant service, McCarthy 
reported the daytime, no-knock service. Because entry had been 
effected by a "SWAT" team, McCarthy could not say whether the 
apartment door had actually been broken open (R. 127-129). He 
explained the no-knock, nighttime service request in the 
affidavit as motivated by the reported threats toward Jimmy and 
Mrs. Jimmy, plus his judgment that such entry was "always safer" 
(R. 129, 131).2 This judgment was probed by defense counsel, 
and met with some skepticism by the trial court, upon its own 
questions to the detective (R. 133-34, 170-73). 
At the end of the hearing, the trial court ordered 
memoranda from the parties on the issue of whether actual daytime 
2Detective McCarthy also explained that he only expected to 
find small, readily-disposable quantities of drugs on the premises 
(R. 129-30). However, this information was not clearly set forth 
in his affidavit. 
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service of the warrant mooted any problem with an improper 
nighttime authorization (R. 196). Also at the end of the 
hearing, defense counsel asserted, "One other thing I wanted to 
say, my argument is based on the Utah Constitution as well as the 
United States Constitution" (R. 199). 
The* parties submitted the requested memoranda (R. 39-
41, 54-59). Defendant's memorandum cited Utah's statute 
governing nighttime search warrant service, but again, did not 
articulate whether the Utah Constitution was necessarily more 
restrictive on this question than federal law (R. 39-41). 
Upon review of the memoranda and the arguments at the 
motion hearing, the trial court issued a written memorandum 
decision (R. 66-70, reproduced at the appendix to this brief). 
The court determined that the affidavit, "taken as a whole," 
established probable cause to issue the warrant (R. 67). 
Revisiting its concerns about the safety justification for no-
knock service, the court acknowledged its lack of expertise: 
[T]he Court does not claim any expertise in 
police procedures, nor does the Court claim 
any expertise in the execution of "no knock" 
warrants and the hazards related thereto, and 
the evidence the Court has before it is from 
a police professional who has expressed his 
opinions, stated the reasons therefor[], and 
the Court is not at liberty to ignore that 
evidence, absent some legitimate reason to do 
so, and no legitimate legal reason appears to 
exist. 
(R. 67-68). Therefore, the trial court ruled that the no-knock 
service had been properly authorized (R. 68). It further held 
that actual daytime service mooted any possible problem with the 
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magistrate's authorization of a nighttime search (id,)« 
Accordingly, the motion to suppress was denied. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the trial court, defendant did not articulate a 
separate state constitutional analysis in support of his motion 
to suppress. Accordingly, federal fourth amendment law controls 
this appeal, and requires that deference be paid to the 
magistrate's probable cause ruling. Deference to both the 
magistrate and the trial court's affirmation of the magistrate's 
decision is appropriate as a matter of proper respect toward 
these front-line judicial decision makers. 
Defendant fails to show that the magistrate and the 
trial court both clearly erred in making and affirming the 
probable cause determination. His "informant unreliability" 
argument fails because the informants in question here, concerned 
relatives of a cocaine-dependent individual, can be presumed 
reliable. Also, Detective McCarthy's independent investigation 
sufficiently corroborated the information provided by those 
informants. Finally, the "particularity" argument raised on 
appeal was not presented in the trial court, and in any event 
fails on its merits. 
As for the no-knock service, heightened deference is 
due to the magistrate, with an emphasis on reasonableness, not 
probable cause. The trial court correctly observed that judicial 
officers lack expertise to judge the safest means of serving 
search warrants. Therefore, given officer expertise, plus 
9 
specific information tending to show that the particular search 
may pose physical danger to anybody involved, no-knock service 
authority should be upheld on review. Also, because defendant 
revealed no details of how this no-knock search was actually 
effected, full review of its reasonableness is difficult. 
Finally, the trial court correctly held that daytime 
service of this warrant mooted, or rendered harmless, any 
possible error in the nighttime service authorization. Such 
holding is supported by case law and policy. With respect to the 
latter, police cannot commit misconduct when they choose to carry 
out a search in a less intrusive manner than that authorized by 
the magistrate. Such choice should be encouraged, by not 
suppressing evidence when possible magistrate error has actually 
been corrected by police officers. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE MAGISTRATE'S PROBABLE CAUSE FINDING, AND 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AFFIRMATION OF THAT 
FINDING, SHOULD BE REAFFIRMED ON APPEAL. 
Defendant first challenges the magistrate's probable 
cause determination. Under the correct, deferential standard of 
appellate review, the challenge should be rejected. 
A. Settled Fourth Amendment Law Requires Deferential 
Review of the Magistrate's Probable Cause 
Determination• 
Under the fourth amendment, a magistrate's probable 
cause-based decision to issue a search warrant, so long as based 
upon specific facts in the supporting affidavit, is reversed on 
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review only if it is clearly erroneous. State v. Babbell, 770 
P.2d 987, 990 (Utah 1989). Accord United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 914-15, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3416 (1984), and State v. 
Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah App. 1991) ("great deference" 
accorded to magistrate's determination). In making that 
decision, a magistrate must "make a practical, common-sense 
decision whether, given all the circumstances . . . there is a 
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
235, 103 S Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983). Accord Weaver, 817 P.2d at 833 
(probability or "reasonable belief," not certainty, is standard 
for issuance of warrant). 
1. Waiver of State Constitutional Argument. 
At some length, defendant argues that this Court should 
not defer to the magistrate's probable cause ruling (Br. of 
Appellant at 7-13). His argument depends heavily on the appendix 
to State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 817 
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), and on a concurring opinion in Weaver that 
criticizes the deferential fourth amendment approach. He 
therefore asks this Court to apply non-deferential search warrant 
review under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution (Br. 
of Appellant at 13). 
The first problem with defendant's argument is that he 
did not properly articulate a separate, more rigorous analysis 
under the state constitution than under the fourth amendment. 
His written motion to suppress and his argument at the hearing of 
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that motion did no more than nominally cite Article I, section 14 
(R. 21, 199). His memorandum in support of that motion, asking 
to invalidate the warrant "on State constitutional grounds" (R. 
41), actually relied on Utah statutes, not constitutional 
provisions, and was limited to the narrow issue of possible 
mootness of the nighttime warrant service authorization. 
Under these circumstances, defendant has not preserved 
his state constitution-based warrant challenge for review by this 
Court. See State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272-73 & n.5 (Utah 
App. 1990) (state constitutional arguments must be properly 
articulated and thoughtfully analyzed in the trial courts to 
allow appellate review). He failed to prevent the now-asserted 
error by timely drawing it to the trial court's attention: 
"Excuse m e . . . I know the game's almost over, but 
just for the record, I don't think my buzzer was 
working properly." 
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Accord State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991) (trial 
court must be given first opportunity to correct its errors). 
Nor has he demonstrated "plain error" or "exceptional 
circumstances" that might afford him relief from the appellate 
waiver normally resulting from such failure. See State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-26 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. Reasons for Deferential Appellate Review. 
While defendant's state constitution-based argument 
should be rejected on the basis of waiver alone, revisitation of 
considerations supporting deferential appellate review of search 
warrants seems appropriate. This question has been debated by 
the State and counsel for defendant on several occasions, 
including State v. Rosenbaum, No. 910514-CA, and State v. Ruiz, 
No. 920126-CA, now pending before this Court. The State's 
position in those cases, briefly put, is that appellate deference 
is proper, as a matter of respect for magistrates and trial court 
judges. Those judicial officers, sworn to uphold the federal and 
state constitutions in a fashion that favors neither the State 
nor criminal suspects, should be presumed to have done so absent 
the clearest showing to the contrary. 
Here defendant implies, without directly asserting the 
point, that the foregoing presumption is invalid. He refers, for 
example, to "meaningful," "neutral and detached," and "thorough" 
judicial review of warrant affidavits, as if to suggest that only 
appellate courts, not magistrates and trial courts, are capable 
of such review (Br. of Appellant at 7, 12). He also suggests 
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that police officers may "forum shop" for magistrates less 
inclined toward, or less capable of, careful scrutiny of warrant 
affidavits (Br. of Appellant at 10). 
Supporting his "forum shopping" theory, defendant asks 
this Court to "take judicial notice of the fact that Utah 
magistrates do not uniformly have the opportunity to develop 
expertise in issuing search warrants" (Br. of Appellant at 9). 
Not only does this "fact" not seem "capable of ready and accurate 
determination" under Rule 201(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, it 
appears to be untrue. Under Rule 3-403, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, "all judges, commissioners and court staff," 
which would seem to encompass magistrates, receive thirty hours 
of orientation upon appointment, and thirty hours per year of 
continuing judicial education. Thus it appears that magistrates 
are uniformly required to develop their skills. 
If non-deferential review of search warrants is ever to 
be implemented, then, it should be done on some basis other than 
unsupported innuendo to the effect that magistrates and trial 
courts cannot "meaningfully" assess warrant affidavits in the 
required detached and neutral fashion. Until and unless Utah's 
appellate courts assume front-line responsibility for probable 
cause determinations, deference to the judicial officers who now 
perform that function should be maintained.3 
3Indeedir a procedure might be developed in which warrants are 
issued only by "on call" appellate panels, utilizing modern 
electronic communication. Similarly, after-the-fact search and 
seizure review might limit trial courts to finding such "underlying 
facts" as may be needed (presumably none in the case of warrant 
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Accordingly, especially in cases involving warrant-
supported searches, defendants seeking to suppress the fruits of 
a search should be held to a heavy burden of persuasion, under 
both federal and state constitutional standards. See Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2684 (1978) (search 
warrant presumed valid). In the trial court, such a defendant 
should be required to show clear error in the magistrate's 
issuance of the warrant. See State v. Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d 135, 
514 P.2d 800, 802 & n.l (1973). Upon failing to carry that 
burden in the trial court, defendant's burden should be even 
heavier on appeal. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Rejected Defendant's 
Challenge to the Magistrate's Issuance of the 
Search Warrant. 
Defendant correctly states that review of a probable 
cause determination examines the "totality of the circumstances," 
which may include "informant reliability" issues (Br. of 
Appellant at 14-15). See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 
103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983); State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 
1101-02 (Utah 1985); Weaver, 817 P.2d at 832-33. This case 
appropriately calls for a look at informant reliability, for 
Detective McCarthy's investigation did not directly reveal 
defendant's criminal behavior. Compare State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 
515, 516 (Utah App. 1992) (defendant sold drugs in "controlled 
buy" arranged by officer). Nevertheless, bearing in mind the 
affidavits, cf.. Weaver, 817 P.2d at 836), followed by immediate 
certification of the case to an appellate panel for the probable 
cause conclusion to be derived from those facts. 
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proper burden of proof and standard of review, the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to suppress should be affirmed. 
1. The Motion Hearing: Opportunities Lost. 
In being afforded an evidentiary hearing to challenge 
the search warrant, defendant was actually aided more than he 
deserved in his motion to suppress. Because his motion contained 
only a bare assertion that the warrant affidavit contained 
material falsehoods, he was not entitled to put on any evidence. 
See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72, 98 S. Ct. at 2684-85, adopted in 
State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986) (absent specific 
threshold showing of deliberate material falsity by warrant 
affiant, defendant challenging probable cause cannot have 
evidentiary hearing). Defendant could have been limited to 
arguing only the sufficiency of the warrant affidavit. 
Defendant received another "gift" when Detective 
McCarthy disclosed the identities of the confidential informants 
who had given information used in the warrant affidavit. He was 
by no means obliged to give this information. Purser, 828 P.2d 
at 519-20 (citing authorities). Once they were identified, 
however, defendant could have called Mrs. Jimmy, Jimmy's parents, 
and even the cocaine-habituated Jimmy himself to testify at the 
hearing of the motion to suppress. In short, at the time of that 
hearing, the validity of the warrant was no longer dependent upon 
"unnamed police informers," cj£. State v. Treadwav, 28 Utah 2d 
160, 499 P.2d 846, 848 (1972). The informants were named, and 
could have been called as witnesses to ascertain whether 
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Detective McCarthy truthfully recounted their statements in his 
warrant affidavit, and to test their reliability. 
Defendant thus had ample opportunity, well beyond what 
could be expected, to challenge this warrant in the trial court. 
His failure to take full advantage of that opportunity should be 
held against him on appeal, especially in regard to his 
"informant unreliability" argument. 
2. Informant Reliability Was Adequately Shown. 
In State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 1990), this 
Court, citing Treadwav, reiterated the principle that "[c]ourts 
view the testimony of citizen informers with less rigid scrutiny 
than the testimony of police informers. . . . This is because 
citizen informers, unlike police informers, volunteer information 
out of concern for the community and not for personal benefit." 
798 P.2d at 286. Accordingly, the "concerned citizen" informant 
in Brown was deemed sufficiently reliable to not require "rigid 
scrutiny," i,d. at 286-87. 
In this case, Detective McCarthy's affidavit reveals 
that his informants should be deemed even more reliable than the 
"concerned citizen" in Brown. These informants were concerned 
not just with community well-being, but with that of a close 
family member, "Jimmy." Common sense strongly suggests that 
their motive in reporting the apparent criminal activity was not 
some kind of "revenge," but more likely an understandable desire 
to interrupt their loved one's drug habit. The affidavit also 
reflected that the informants had observed independent instances 
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in which Jimmy apparently purchased cocaine in the suspect 
apartment. Accordingly, the informants corroborated each others' 
reports, each buttressing the reliability of the other. 
3. Independent Corroboration of Informant Reports. 
Detective McCarthy's independent investigation also 
supported the magistrate's finding of Ma fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime" would be found in the 
apartment, Gates, 462 U.S. at 235, 103 S. Ct. at 2332. While 
McCarthy did not directly confirm criminal activity in the 
apartment, he did uncover independent circumstantial evidence 
supporting his informants' reports. Jimmy, the "spouse" 
identified in the affidavit, was independently found to have a 
criminal narcotics record (R. 31). Traffic to and from the 
apartment was observed to fit a pattern consistent with drug 
trafficking (id.). 
Nor was the "hearsay upon hearsay" nature of the 
informants' reports a bar to issuance of the warrant. See 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191-92 (double hearsay, if reliable, not a 
problem in warrant issuance); Utah R. Evid. 805, 1101(b)(3). 
This was especially so once Jimmy's history of drug abuse was 
independently confirmed, making it more reasonable to infer that 
his visits to the apartment were indeed for illicit purposes. 
4. Particularity Requirement. 
Defendant also complains that the warrant and affidavit 
failed to identify the apartment to be searched with sufficient 
particularity (Br. of Appellant at 17). This issue was not 
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raised in the motion to suppress, nor pursued at the hearing of 
that motion, and was therefore waived. It was also appropriately 
waived: the premises to be searched are clearly identified by 
number and directional coordinates as but one of two "duplex" 
apartments (R. 25). Clearly, apartment 3720 was to be searched; 
apartment 3718 was to be left alone. 
In a novel but also unpreserved argument, defendant 
asserts that the warrant affidavit should have included specific 
evidence that the contraband to be seized could not have been 
obtained by subpoena (Br. of Appellant at 19, citing Utah Code 
Ann. S 77-23-3(2) (1990)). Briefly, it seems unlikely that 
someone suspected of dealing in illicit drugs would comply with a 
subpoena requiring him or her to surrender evidence of such 
activity. Indeed, unless such a person were foolish beyond 
belief, he or she would be expected, upon receiving such a 
subpoena, to expeditiously conceal or destroy such evidence. 
Recitation of the likely failure of the subpoena process, then, 
hardly seems necessary in a case like this one. 
5. Summary: Totality of the Circumstances. 
All in all, McCarthy's affidavit showed the following: 
a confirmed narcotics abuser was reported, reasonably reliably, 
to be purchasing cocaine at a specific apartment, where other 
traffic consistent with drug dealing was also observed. These 
factors, in their totality, provided a substantial basis for the 
magistrate's probable cause finding. The federally-required 
deference to that finding, coupled with affirmation of that 
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finding by the trial court, should obligate this Court to 
reaffirm the issuance of the warrant. This is so even if this 
Court, had the warrant affidavit been presented to it in the 
first place, might have not issued the warrant. 
POINT TWO 
THE MAGISTRATE'S AUTHORIZATION OF NO-KNOCK 
WARRANT SERVICE SHOULD BE REAFFIRMED. 
Defendant next contends that the magistrate erred in 
authorizing "no-knock" service of the search warrant. This 
contention was correctly rejected by the trial court. 
A. No-Knock Warrant Service Authority Should be 
Deferentially Reviewed for Reasonableness. 
By its terms, Utah's no-knock statute comes into play 
only "[w]hen a search warrant has been issued . . .." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-23-10 (1990). Its focus is not probable cause, but 
only the question of how the search will be conducted. See State 
v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1988) (no-knock challenge did 
not assail underlying search, but only "the manner of entry"). 
The no-knock statute requires "proof" that if the search is 
cinnounced, evidence "may" be lost, or that physical harm to any 
person "may" result. Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(2). 
Defendant stresses the no-knock "proof" requirement 
(Br. of Appellant at 22). However, the "may" language should be 
emphasized, giving rise to a lower standard of proof for no-knock 
authority than for issuance of the underlying warrant. After 
all, the warrant is a judicial order to search a particular 
place, Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-1 (1990), based upon probable 
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cause. The no-knock statute should not revisit probable cause: 
instead# it should be viewed as setting the parameters of 
reasonableness in following the judicial order. 
In assessing the reasonableness of a no-knock request, 
deference to the police, charged with carrying out the search, is 
appropriate. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257, 99 
S. Ct. 1682, 1693 (1978) (question of how to conduct warrant-
authorized search "is generally left to the discretion of the 
executing officers," subject to reasonableness requirement). 
They, not reviewing judges, possess the hands-on expertise in 
conducting searches. They, not reviewing judges, are directly 
responsible for protecting the physical safety of everybody 
affected by this hazardous undertaking. In this case the trial 
judge, reviewing the no-knock request, properly acknowledged his 
own lack of expertise and upheld the no-knock service authorized 
by the magistrate (R. 67-68). 
Consistent with the position it has advanced in State 
v. Rosenbaum, No. 910514-CA (pending), and with State v. Rowe, 
806 P.2d 730, 732-33 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991), the State believes that deference to an officer's 
no-knock warrant service request must have appropriate 
limitations. Thus while officer expertise with searches 
generally must be considered in screening or reviewing such a 
request, some additional evidence, particular to the case at 
hand, must be presented to justify or affirm a no-knock request. 
Rosenbaum, Br. of Appellee at 22; Rowe, 806 P.2d at 733 ("sparse" 
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affidavit contained sufficient case-specific information to 
support no-knock service). 
Subject to the foregoing limitation, then, no-knock 
authority, granted by the warrant-issuing magistrate and affirmed 
by the trial court, should be reviewed on appeal with the utmost 
deference. Such authority should be reversed only upon a 
determination that it was clearly unreasonable to grant it. 
B. Th€* Warrant Affidavit Adequately Supported No-
Knock Service Authority. 
With the foregoing standards in mind, this Court should 
reaffirm the magistrate's no-knock authorization. With regard to 
general experience, the warrant affidavit established that 
Detective McCarthy had extensive experience in the preparation 
and service of narcotics search warrants (R. 30). That 
experience had led him to conclude that no-knock warrant service 
is "always safer," because narcotics dealers are often armed (R. 
32-33).A This likelihood has also been noted by Utah's 
appellate courts. See State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah 
1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); State v. Leonard. 825 P.2d 
664, 670 n.9 (Utah App. 1991), petition for cert, filed. No. 
920140 (Utah March 11, 1992). Thus a general but well-recognized 
physical safety risk was present. 
ASee Commonwealth v. Grubb, 595 A.2d 133, 135 n.3 (Pa. Super. 
1991) (officer had found weapons ninety percent of the time, over 
course of 200 searches). Interestingly, at the hearing on the 
motion to suppress, McCarthy retreated somewhat from his assertion 
that no-knock service is always safer, acknowledging that "some" 
narcotics searches do not require such service (R. 132). 
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There was also a case-specific safety risk. Mrs. 
"Jimmy" had reported threats from the occupants of the apartment, 
directed toward Jimmy and, through Jimmy, toward her (R. 31, 32). 
Admittedly, this did not constitute conclusive proof that the 
police search would be met with violence; however, such certainty 
is not and should not be required. Where a safety justification 
for a no-knock search is presented, an officer's request to take 
precautions need only be reasonable. See State v. Rovbal, 716 
P.2d 291, 293-94 (Utah 1986) (affirming the reasonableness of 
precautions when officers "enter hostile environs"). Thus the 
specific, if slender, possibility of violence in this case should 
be held sufficient to uphold no-knock warrant service. 
Section 77-23-10(2) also allows no-knock warrant 
service upon a showing "that the object of the search may be 
quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted" upon announcement of 
the search. Here the suspected criminal activity, cocaine 
dealing, would seem to suggest ready disposal of the evidence. 
See Rowe, 806 P.2d at 733 (small amount of drugs suspected; no-
knock authority upheld). Compare State v. Pierson, 472 N.W.2d 
898, 903 (Neb. 1991) (search for slot machine; no-knock entry not 
needed). Unfortunately, while Detective McCarthy expressed his 
belief that he would only find small, quickly-disposable 
quantities of drugs at the apartment during the hearing of the 
suppression motion (R. 126), he did not clearly set this out in 
his warrant affidavit. Further, given that he also sought 
evidence of a major sales operation—packaging material, cash, 
23 
and records (R. 32-33)—it seems that the "ready disposability" 
inference was rather weak. Accordingly, this no-knock search 
depended primarily on the better-articulated safety concerns. 
Regarding those concerns, where a magistrate determines 
that the risk of physical harm to persons outweighs problems of 
fright or property damage resulting from a no-knock search, as 
contemplated by section 77-23-10(2), that determination should be 
given deference. The trial court correctly deferred to the 
magistrate's decision. This Court should do the same, and 
reaffirm the no-knock service authority in this search warrant. 
C. There is Insufficient Evidence to Fully Review the 
Propriety of this No-Knock Search. 
It should also be noted that defendant failed to elicit 
adequate evidence upon which the reasonableness of this search 
can be assessed. The reasonableness of a warranted search 
"depends on the facts of the case." Buck. 756 P.2d at 703. See 
also State v. Sessions, 583 P.2d 44, 45 (Utah 1978) ("a defendant 
must submit some evidence in support of his motion to suppress or 
the motion would be denied"). Defendant's sole witness at the 
hearing of his motion to suppress, Detective McCarthy, could not 
relate the exact manner of this no-knock search: he only knew 
that the apartment door was "probably forced open" (R. 127). 
With reasonableness the standard, the manner in which a 
search is actually conducted must be known if after-the-fact 
review is to be meaningful. Even a "no-knock" search, more 
properly a search "without notice of [the officer's] authority 
and purpose" under section 77-23-10, can be carried out in a wide 
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variety of more or less reasonable ways. On the one hand, 
searching officers might find the door to the premises open or 
unlocked, or might use a ruse to obtain entry. On the other, 
extreme violence, well beyond what a magistrate would contemplate 
in authorizing no-knock service, might be imagined. 
In short, no-knock searches should not all be presumed 
to be the same. Defendants wishing to challenge no-knock 
authority should bear this in mind, and present sufficient 
evidence to meaningfully support such challenges. 
POINT THREE 
ACTUAL SERVICE OF THE WARRANT DURING THE 
DAYTIME MOOTED, OR RENDERED HARMLESS, ANY 
ERROR IN THE MAGISTRATE'S AUTHORIZATION OF A 
NIGHTTIME SEARCH. 
A significant piece of evidence that defendant did 
elicit was the fact that this search was carried out during 
daylight hours, even though the magistrate had authorized 
nighttime warrant service (R. 34, 127). The trial court held 
that such actual service mooted any possible problem with the 
nighttime authority. Assuming, without deciding, that nighttime 
service was improperly authorized, that holding was correct. 
In State v. Buck. 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988), officers 
conducted a warranted residential search upon a no-knock entry, 
failing to recognize that their warrant did not authorize such 
entry. However, nobody was home at the time. Id. at 700-01 & 
n.l. The Utah Supreme Court held that because nobody was home 
when the search occurred, the safety and privacy concerns 
underlying the normal "knock-and-announce" requirement had not 
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been implicated. JEd. Therefore, suppression of the seized 
evidence was not required. Id. at 702-03 (citing authorities). 
Under Buck, if a search warrant is executed in a 
clearly unauthorized manner, but privacy and safety interests are 
infringed no more than they would be in a routine search, the 
fruits of the search are admissible as evidence. It should 
follow that if a no-knock or nighttime entry is. authorized in a 
warrant, but officers do not actually execute the warrant on such 
basis, the s€*ized evidence is also admissible. Indeed, in People 
v. Barber, 449 N.Y.S. 2d 140, 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982), evidence 
was not suppressed where police did not rely upon an improper no-
knock authorization, but instead announced themselves when 
serving the warrant. Similarly, in State v. Sherrick, 98 Ariz. 
46, 402 P.2d 1, 9 (1965) (en banc), evidence seized during a 
daylight search was not suppressed, even though the warrant 
improperly authorized a nighttime search. 
Cases such as Buck, Barber, and Sherrick stand for the 
principle that where violation of a criminal procedure rule does 
not violate a "fundamental" constitutional right, suppression of 
evidence obtained through such violation is not required. See 
State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366, 1368-69 (Utah 1987) (officer 
improperly acted outside his statutory authority; because he did 
not thereby violate defendant's "fundamental" rights, evidence 
was admissible). Similarly here, no "fundamental" right of 
defendant to avoid a nighttime search was violated: no nighttime 
search occurred. 
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Further, suppression of evidence under these 
circumstances would actually deter laudable police conduct. The 
officers here conducted this search in a less intrusive manner 
than authorized in their warrant. If the seized evidence is 
nevertheless suppressed, in some effort to deter magistrate 
error, police officers will have no incentive to effectively 
correct such errors themselves. 
Clearly the better approach, if the concern is 
ultimately with protecting citizens against actual unreasonable 
searches, is to leave room for officers to re-think, and not rely 
upon, questionable magistrate orders. Indeed, United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), avoids suppression 
where officers reasonably rely upon a warrant that is later 
invalidated. That being the case, it is surely wise policy to 
avoid suppression where officers do not rely upon some provision 
in a search warrant that might be questionable. Indeed, such 
officer conduct should be encouraged. 
"Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does 
not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded." Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). If the magistrate erred 
in authorizing a nighttime search, such error should be 
disregarded. The trial court's ruling comported with this rule, 
and should be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the order denying 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence, and his subsequent 
conviction, should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this "2> day of September, 
1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY ^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to ROGER 
K. SCOWCROFT AND ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, attorneys for appellant, 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, 424 East 500 South, Suite 
300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this day of September, 
1992. 
AL^_ 
28 
Appendix 
(Trial Court's Memorandum Decision) 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 2 3 1992 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 911900752 
911900753 
vs. : 
MARK S. BLAHA, : 
ROBERT TODD WHITE, 
Defendants. 
Before the Court is the Motion of the defendants 
above-named, through their counsel of record, to suppress 
evidence seized as a result of a search warrant authorizing 
search of the premises known as 3720 South 3375 West in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. The warrant was issued on January 
31, 1991 after presentation to Circuit Court Judge William A. 
Thorne, acting as magistrate of the Third Circuit Court. 
The matter was before the Court on December 4, 1991, where 
evidence was presented and oral argument had. Following oral 
argument, the Court indicated that it would take the matter 
under advisement and allow counsel time to brief a legal issue 
that had arisen based upon the evidence received during the 
hearing on the question of whether or not the daytime execution 
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of this warrant moots any potential defects that may have been 
part of the issuance of the warrant relating to nighttime 
execution,. The parties have filed their respective pleadings, 
the Court has considered the same, and being fully advised, 
enters the following Memorandum Decision. 
The Court is satisfied that the allegations in the 
Affidavit, taken as a whole, are sufficient to authorize the 
issuance of a search warrant. The Court is further satisfied 
that the evidence supports a finding that the additional 
provision in the search warrant authorizing "no knock" 
execution is satisfactory. The €>vidence suggests that the "no 
knock" warrant in this case was appropriate because of the 
potential of the destruction of evidence, particularly where 
small amounts may be involved, and for the safety of not only 
officers executing the warrant, but the persons who may be on 
the premises when the warrant is executed. 
While the Court expressed concerns in its questioning of 
the State's witnesses in this matter regarding the concept of 
safety, the Court does not claim any expertise in police 
procedures, nor does the Court claim any expertise in the 
execution of "no knock" warrants and the hazards related 
thereto, and the evidence the Court has before it is from a 
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police professional who has expressed his opinions, stated the 
reasons therefore, and the Court is not at liberty to ignore 
that evidence, absent some legitimate reason to do so, and no 
legitimate legal reason appears to exist. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that there is 
sufficient basis for the issuance of the "no knock" special 
provisions of this warrant. 
Turning to the question of whether or not there is 
sufficient basis to authorize the execution of the warrant 
during the nighttime, the Court is satisfied that any potential 
defects in the contents of the supporting documentation and the 
warrant authorizing its execution at nighttime has been mooted, 
inasmuch as the warrant was not executed in the nighttime, but 
rather during the daytime. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that the 
defendants' Motions to Suppress must and should be denied. 
Counsel for the State is to prepare an Order indicating the 
Court's denial of the defendants' Motion to Suppress, and 
present the same to the Court for review and signature pursuant 
to the Code of Judicial Administration. 
This matter is further scheduled on the Court's calendar to 
determine what additional dates, trial or otherwise, are 
U0068 
STATE V. BLAHA AND WHITE PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
necessary to bring this matter to a conclusion. Counsel and 
the defendants are to be present at the/date indicated in the 
attached notice. 
Dated this &3< day of January,/1992. 
'TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUQ$E 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
this ^ r day of January, 1992: 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
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